Updated: 2026-09-09
The equilibrium, welfare, utility, and fairness results are formalized. Proposition 3.1’s cutoff-monotonicity claim and Proposition B.2’s weighted optimum require the additional conditions stated below.
Liu, Garg, and Borgs, Strategic Ranking, AISTATS 2022, PMLR 151, pp. 2489–2518. The scope includes the 18 named results in the main text and supplement, with their governing definitions. Empirical implementation and unnumbered social-welfare discussion are outside this scope. The model note explains tie priorities and continuum equilibrium.
| Result | Comparison with the paper |
|---|---|
| Proposition 2.1: rank preservation | Exact. |
| Theorem 2.2: second-price effort | Exact. |
| Proposition 3.1: applicant welfare | Pure-randomization optimum exact; cutoff monotonicity under additional regularity conditions. Details |
| Proposition 3.2: private utility | Exact. |
| Proposition 3.3: three-level improvement | Exact. |
| Proposition 3.4: societal utility | Exact. |
| Proposition 4.1: group equilibrium | Exact. |
| Proposition 4.2: welfare gap | Exact with source clarification. For almost every type, the gap is nonnegative; among types admitted in both groups, it is positive exactly when disadvantaged-group effort is positive. Details |
| Proposition 4.3: gap comparative statics | Exact with source clarification. Among types admitted in both groups at the higher cutoff, the gap increases weakly almost everywhere, strictly with positive disadvantaged effort at the lower cutoff; derivative claims apply where differentiability holds. Details |
| Proposition 4.4: access | Exact. |
| Corollary A.1: effort comparative statics | Exact. |
| Remark A.2: ties in pre-effort skill | Exact. |
| Proposition B.1: multidimensional ranking | Exact with source clarification. Rank preservation concerns admission rewards; different weighted-skill ranks can receive the same reward within a policy band. |
| Proposition B.2: weighted utility | Exact under additional regularity conditions: affine skill and the stated curvature restrictions. Details |
| Lemma C.1: tied scores | Exact. |
| Lemma C.2: null deviations | Exact. |
| Lemma C.3: cost-gap ordering | Exact. |
| Lemma C.4: production-gap ordering | Exact. |
The source clarification note states the conditions, formulas, counterexamples, and proof changes in mathematical terms.
All 18 selected results are proved on the stated domains. The unrestricted versions of Proposition 3.1’s cutoff monotonicity and Proposition B.2’s weighted optimum are false; the additional conditions are in Section 6.
For Proposition 3.1’s monotonicity clause only, put and . Require concavity of on , and of where . No zero-baseline-production or positive-minimum-skill restriction is added. The unconditional pure-randomization optimum does not use these premises.
For B.2 only, measurable skill is affine and nondegenerate with nonnegative lower endpoint. Require , , concavity of on , convexity of on , twice differentiability of cost and production on their stated open domains, and continuity of . Keep source endpoint continuity and independent regular unmeasurable skill. The full B.2 statement spells out conditional means and the policy domain. No supporting-line or optimizer property is assumed.
Known priorities, the strong applicant-wise AE quantifier, the hard residual budget in B.2, and weak/strict interpretation are model/statement clarifications. They are not additional economic shape assumptions.
The proof uses the correct welfare derivative, normalized utilities and admissible witnesses, and the source effort-comparison indices. For Proposition B.2, utility curvature establishes a global optimum; a zero derivative alone would not suffice.
Useful techniques include preserving rewards within rank bands, comparing equilibria under changes on null sets, integrating normalized tail means, and deriving globally optimal weights from utility curvature.
The welfare skill condition is strictly broader than log concavity. For differentiable interior skill it is equivalent to being nonincreasing. The quantile separates the conditions. Every technology , , satisfies the score-cost condition, including uniform skill on any nondegenerate nonnegative interval. These are proved supporting extensions, not extra source claims. The conditions are sufficient, not claimed necessary. Mathematical statement.
The memo explains the local formula and proof clarifications. The weak and strict welfare comparisons need no additional economic assumption; derivative claims apply where the derivative exists. The two substantive restrictions are stated in Section 6.
Proposition 3.1’s unrestricted cutoff-monotonicity claim and Proposition B.2’s every-cutoff optimum have counterexamples. Their restricted versions are proved under the conditions in Section 6.
PaperInterface.lean states each selected result; ProofInterface.lean supplies its proof. The comparison uses actual equilibrium score distributions and all feasible deviations.
The source cost, production, skill, policy, and equilibrium assumptions are recorded in the model review. The two additional sets of conditions are stated in Section 6.
The source map links each named result and its formulas to the formal statement. The memo distinguishes the restricted claims from their unrestricted printed versions.
The proof reuses the shared probability, measure, order, and convexity layers. General tie-rank and probability-integral-transform work is available in the shared foundation. Paper-specific population, incentive, and utility bridges remain in the paper modules. The upper-tail skill and power-technology extensions are proved locally; no external unpinned Lean code is imported.
The paper-facing DAG displays all 18 named results and their governing mathematical dependencies. The two local restriction nodes are distinct from ordinary clarified results, and B.1 has no fixed budget. The diagram compiled and was visually inspected: labels, arrowheads, reading order, and node boundaries are legible without overlap. The diagram source is retained. The independent terminal audit also passed.
The paper build, independent mathematical review, final audit, and strict closeout passed on September 9, 2026. The closeout record links the evidence. Human result annotations remain 0/18.
The source inventory covers the scalar cost/production/skill model, finite and two-level policies, actual tie-broken ranks, individual best response and equilibrium, pure randomization and deterministic admission, applicant/private/societal utility, group population and mixture ranks, clipped group thresholds, welfare gaps and access, exchangeable multidimensional costs, the hard-budget multitask model, and conditional weighted utility. These are semantic declaration routes, not reflexive proof wrappers.
Section 4 lists the ten main-text and eight appendix results. Their proofs cover the domains and conditions stated there.
The statement review and model review record the comparison with the source. The closeout record selects the accepted evidence.
The source inventory includes all 18 named results and their governing definitions. The unnumbered social-welfare footnote remains supporting discussion, outside the selected theorem scope.