Updated: 2026-08-04
Formalized for finite equal sides with complete strict preferences. The checked results cover stable and side-optimal matching, proposing-side truthfulness, manipulation impossibilities, and the efficient truthful procedure. The broad extension to quotas is outside this named-result scope.
The audited source is Alvin E. Roth, The Economics of Matching:
Stability and Incentives, Mathematics of Operations
Research 7(4), 1982. The canonical local source artifact is
Roth82StableMatching.txt, SHA-256
55d2c35a8077a74dc9953dcb6f838fcd6e91edc9e77079a2419f185835a79fd4.
The source record is linked to https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.7.4.617.
Normal scope follows the repository’s named-theory policy. It includes the paper-facing definitions of the preference profile, matching procedure, marriage model, complete outcome, stability, individual quotas, stable procedure, dominant truthfulness, efficiency, side-optimality, and simple misrepresentation, together with every numbered theorem, corollary, and lemma. Algorithms, the Section 6 numerical example, proof-local notation, proof narration, and unnumbered extension prose are deep-only unless needed to prove one of those endpoints.
| Result | Comparison with the paper |
|---|---|
| Theorems 1–2 | Exact: stable complete matching and both side-optimal outcomes. |
| Theorems 3–5; Corollary 5.1; Lemmas 1–2 | Exact: same truthfulness, impossibility, and misrepresentation statements. |
| Theorems 6–7 | Exact: same welfare and arbitrary-rank impossibility conclusions. |
| Broad both-sided-quota extension | Deferred: the unnumbered claim is not used as credit for a general many-to-many incentive theorem. |
No mathematical obligation remains in the configured normal named-theory scope. The broad unnumbered assertion that all arguments carry over virtually unchanged to arbitrary individual quotas is not used as source credit for a general many-to-many incentive theorem. The paper’s quota-outcome definition is formalized with explicit finiteness of every partner set and exact finite cardinality equal to the corresponding quota. The one-to-one deferred-acceptance machinery used by the named results is checked through the matching library. The exact many-to-one waiting-list runner is auxiliary quota support. A future deep-paper review could formulate and prove a precise responsive-preference theorem for the broad both-sided-quota model.
The proposal algorithms, termination narration, possible-partner notation, serial-procedure narration, successful-misrepresentation shorthand, and the Section 6 example remain support or deep-audit material under the normal-scope policy. They are not missing named results.
None.
None.
The direct batched waiting-list runner and its refinement to applicant deferred acceptance can support future many-to-one matching papers. A genuine many-to-many version of Roth’s broad quota sentence would require a precise outcome model, responsive preferences over partner sets, acceptability and outside-option conventions, and a separately proved stability and incentive theorem. It is not obtained merely by cloning seats or renaming agents.
None.
None for the selected results. The unproved broad quota extension is identified in Section 5.
The current direct review selects ten named-result specifications in
PaperInterface.lean, with twelve separately reviewed paper
prerequisites. MainTheorems.lean contains the
three-by-three manipulation witness and its positive, strict-preference
arbitrary-rank extension. GeneralMatching.lean proves
refinement of the source waiting-list procedure to the shared
deferred-acceptance runner. The claim map binds the source statements to
their expanded specifications; the accepted graph and current ledgers
are linked in Section 17.
The paper-facing conditions are the equal finite sides and complete strict preference profiles of the source marriage model, plus the exact first-ranked-partner condition used by the source’s simple-misrepresentation reduction. Every true profile and every reported profile used by a stability or incentive theorem is required to be legal. No stable outcome, side-optimality conclusion, manipulation witness, or runner invariant is accepted as a theorem premise.
The source-domain conditions are included in the current prerequisite review linked in Section 17.
The source has no separately selected displayed-equation item in the normal inventory. Preference comparisons and blocking-pair clauses are audited inside their complete definition or theorem proposition.
The paper reuses the shared assignment, stability, proposer-optimality, and deferred-acceptance infrastructure. The exact paper-facing model bridges and finite counterexamples remain paper-local so their source semantics are inspectable. The source waiting-list runner is connected to the shared runner only by a proved refinement; shared declaration names supply no paper credit.
The dependency-DAG source is docs/DependencyDAG.tex,
with rendered artifact docs/DependencyDAG.pdf. It shows the
21 source items, the checked deferred-acceptance support route, and the
broad quota prose as deep-only. It does not promote support algorithms
or the unchecked deep-only general quota extension to normal source
results.
Codex current-protocol DAG inspection (2026-09-03, 21:30–21:31 EDT). The rendered one-page PDF was visually inspected at 160 dpi. Its source-definition groups and ten named-result boxes were legible, the displayed arrows preserved the result dependencies, and the deep-only quota material remained visually separated from the normal result surface.
The current source-to-Spec ledger records 10 matching judgments. The paper-prerequisite ledger has 12 entries and the library-prerequisite ledger has 0. The closure receipt points to the accepted obligation graph. These saved records distinguish semantic judgments from human annotations; this documentation edit does not reissue them.
| Normal-scope source item | Lean specification and proof | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Preference profile | preferenceProfile_eq_source_definitionSpec,
preferenceProfile_eq_source_definition |
Formalized |
| Matching procedure | matchingProcedure_eq_source_definitionSpec,
matchingProcedure_eq_source_definition |
Formalized |
| Complete strict marriage model | sourceMarriageModel_iff_source_definitionSpec,
sourceMarriageModel_iff_source_definition |
Formalized |
| Complete marriage outcome | completeMarriageOutcome_iff_source_definitionSpec,
completeMarriageOutcome_iff_source_definition |
Formalized |
| Stable marriage | sourceStableMarriage_iff_source_definitionSpec,
sourceStableMarriage_iff_source_definition |
Formalized |
| Side-optimal stable outcome | sideOptimalStableOutcome_iff_source_definitionSpec,
sideOptimalStableOutcome_iff_source_definition |
Formalized |
| Outcome filling individual quotas | fillsIndividualQuotas_iff_source_definitionSpec,
fillsIndividualQuotas_iff_source_definition |
Formalized with explicit finite partner sets |
| Stable matching procedure | sourceStableMatchingProcedure_iff_source_definitionSpec,
sourceStableMatchingProcedure_iff_source_definition |
Formalized |
| Dominant truthfulness for all agents | truthfulForAllAgents_iff_source_definitionSpec,
truthfulForAllAgents_iff_source_definition |
Formalized on legal reports |
| Efficient matching procedure | efficientMatchingProcedure_iff_source_definitionSpec,
efficientMatchingProcedure_iff_source_definition |
Formalized on legal reports |
| Simple report ranking the obtained partner first | manReportStrictlyRanksPartnerFirst_iff_source_definitionSpec,
manReportStrictlyRanksPartnerFirst_iff_source_definition |
Formalized |
The general Assignment carrier, score-table aliases,
operational stability, and deferred-acceptance state machinery remain
visible support vocabulary. They do not create extra normal-scope source
items.
| Named source result | Lean specification and proof | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Theorem 1: a stable marriage exists | theorem1_stable_outcome_existsSpec,
theorem1_stable_outcome_exists |
Formalized |
| Theorem 2: both side-optimal stable outcomes exist | theorem2_side_optimal_stable_outcomesSpec,
theorem2_side_optimal_stable_outcomes |
Formalized |
| Theorem 3: no stable procedure is truthful for all agents | theorem3_no_stable_truthful_procedureSpec,
theorem3_no_stable_truthful_procedure |
Formalized on legal true and reported profiles |
| Theorem 4: an efficient truthful procedure exists | theorem4_efficient_truthful_procedure_existsSpec,
theorem4_efficient_truthful_procedure_exists |
Formalized |
| Theorem 5: the optimal stable procedure is truthful for the proposing side | theorem5_optimal_side_truthfulSpec,
theorem5_optimal_side_truthful |
Formalized in both proposal directions |
| Corollary 5.1: a first choice need not be misrepresented | corollary5_1_first_choice_need_not_be_misrepresentedSpec,
corollary5_1_first_choice_need_not_be_misrepresented |
Formalized with legal initial and replacement reports |
| Lemma 1: the simple replacement report returns the same partner | lemma1_simple_report_same_partnerSpec,
lemma1_simple_report_same_partner |
Formalized |
| Lemma 2: a profitable simple report harms no man | lemma2_simple_report_harms_no_manSpec,
lemma2_simple_report_harms_no_man |
Formalized |
| Theorem 6: no outcome is strictly better for every man | theorem6_no_outcome_strictly_better_for_all_menSpec,
theorem6_no_outcome_strictly_better_for_all_men |
Formalized |
| Theorem 7: manipulation can occur at every rank after first | theorem7_later_choice_manipulation_unavoidableSpec,
theorem7_later_choice_manipulation_unavoidable |
Formalized with positive strict dummy padding |
The current source-to-Spec ledger records 10 matching judgments. The paper-prerequisite ledger has 12 entries and the library-prerequisite ledger has 0. The closure receipt points to the accepted obligation graph. These saved records distinguish semantic judgments from human annotations; this documentation edit does not reissue them.
| Selected source item | Source-facing specification | Judgment |
|---|---|---|
corollary5_1 |
corollary5_1_first_choice_need_not_be_misrepresentedSpec |
matches |
lemma1 |
lemma1_simple_report_same_partnerSpec |
matches |
lemma2 |
lemma2_simple_report_harms_no_manSpec |
matches |
theorem1 |
theorem1_stable_outcome_existsSpec |
matches |
theorem2 |
theorem2_side_optimal_stable_outcomesSpec |
matches |
theorem3 |
theorem3_no_stable_truthful_procedureSpec |
matches |
theorem4 |
theorem4_efficient_truthful_procedure_existsSpec |
matches |
theorem5 |
theorem5_optimal_side_truthfulSpec |
matches |
theorem6 |
theorem6_no_outcome_strictly_better_for_all_menSpec |
matches |
theorem7 |
theorem7_later_choice_manipulation_unavoidableSpec |
matches |
The source map retains the full source inventory and each item’s disposition. The current selected direct results and their judgments are listed in Section 20; definitions and supporting source conditions are reviewed in the separate prerequisite ledger. Source inventory entries are not automatically counted as theorem proofs.