Equal Cutoffs (including differential access): connected
support → also zero probability of every exact score level.
Connected support alone permits atoms: half point mass at zero plus half
uniform mass on
has
.
This refutes only the inference to zero boundary mass.
Probability Formula and Theorems 1–2: add atomless
noise to identify the source’s strict-tail formulas with its
weak matching events:
Without atomlessness, their difference is
.
The formalized Theorems 1–2 state the weak events and prove this
identification.
Theorem 3: add atomless values to derive the
equality of baseline and differential monoculture cutoffs from market
clearing. Necessity for the source conclusion is unresolved; no
counterexample is known here.
Corollary 4 and the strict Theorem 1–2 comparisons: add
nondegenerate noise. The proof uses two distinct support
points; necessity of the full regularity package for the source
conclusions is unproved.
Unqualified appendix intervals/endpoints → nonempty open
intervals meeting the support interior. A singleton has zero
uniform mass, while an endpoint atom can make the lower-endpoint CDF
positive. The interior argument also permits unbounded support.
Welfare and the application
game
Theorem 1: add absolute integrability of value and atomless
values for the welfare limit and strict comparison. Necessity
for the broader theorem is unproved. Theorem 2’s eventual-advantage
branch also uses atomless values.
Differential-access Nash sentence → ex-ante expected payoffs
over same-cardinality application sets, with ranking-monotone
utility and the equal-cutoff success law. The current incentive result
does not cover unrestricted application counts or different information
timing.
Uniform
maximum-concentration example
Footnote means
and
→
;
Chebyshev denominator
→
.
Here
is the maximum of
iid
uniform-
draws. Its variance is
,
so the corrected tail bound is
for every
.
The illustrative maximum-concentration conclusion follows; this is not a
premise of the named results.